No. 14-5784
in the
Supreme Court Of The United States
JACOB TEITELBAUM, individually and
as father to CHILD A and CHILD B,
Petitioner
v.
JUDA KATZ, ET AL.,
Respondents
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Jacob Teitelbaum c/o Ben Friedman 5 Leipnik Way, #102 Monroe, N.Y. 10950 845-782-7830 Petitioner Pro Se
Date: August 12, 2014
i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Petitioner, who was Plaintiff in Trial Court, and Plaintiff-Appellant in Court of Appeals, is Jacob Teitelbaum, individually and as father to Child A and Child B.
Respondents, who were Defendants in Trial Court, and Defendants-Appellees in Court of Appeals, are –
Juda Katz
Chaya Katz
Joel Tennenbaum
Bluma Tennenbaum
David Rubenstein
Kiryas Joel Comm Ambulance CRP
District Family Court of Orange County, 9th Judicial Circuit[1]
Christine Brunet
David Hollander
County of Orange
Children’s Rights Society, Inc.
Stephanie Bazile, Attorney
Andrew P. Bivona, Judge of the Family Court of Orange County[2]
Maria Petrizio, Attorney
Kim Pavlovic, Attorney
John Francis X. Burke, Attorney
Child Protective Services of Orange County
Department of Social Services of Orange County
John Does 1 through 95
Jane Does 1 through 20
[1] District Family Court of Orange County was named as defendant in Petitioner’s Original Complaint, but its name was later deleted from the Amended Complaint.
[2] Hon. Andrew P. Bivona, Judge of the Family Court of Orange County, was named as defendant in Petitioner’s Original Complaint, but his name was later deleted from the Amended Complaint.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page | |
Opinions below ………………………………………………………… | 1 |
Jurisdiction ……………………………………………………………….. | 2 |
Statement of the Case ……………………………………………….. | 2 |
1. Factual Background ……………………………………………… | 2 |
2. Trial Court Proceedings ………………………………………… | 3 |
3. Independent Action pursuant to Rule 60(d) of FRCP …………………………………………. |
12 |
4. Court of Appeals Proceedings ………………………………….. | 13 |
Reasons for granting the petition ……………………………………. | 14 |
1. The Court of Appeals improperly dismissed Petitioner’s appeal after wrongly determining sua sponte that notice of appeal was untimely filed ………………………………………………….. |
14 |
2. The District Court erred in dismissing the independent action brought by Petitioner pursuant to F.R.C.P. Rule 60(d) under the doctrines of res judicata and judicial immunity ………………. |
15 |
3. The District Court improperly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction with respect to Petitioner’s claims against most of the Respondents under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine ……………………………………… |
19 |
4. The District Court erred in not granting Petitioner, a pro se and IFP litigant, even one opportunity to amend his Complaint against most of the Respondents, despite his repeated, timely requests …………………………. |
25 |
5. The District Court erred in dismissing Petitioner’s claims against the Respondents for failure to state claim under 42 U.S.C. §§1983, 1985 …………………………………. |
26 |
iv |
|
6. Petitioner, already rendered homeless and destitute by the powerful Kiryas Joel political machinery for not complying with their diktat; and therefore, suffering continuous violation of his constitutional rights at the hands of Respondents, cannot be left without remedy at law …………………………………… |
31 |
Conclusion ……………………………………………………………….. | 32 |
Appendix
Appendix A (Court of Appeals’ Order dismissing appeal, filed April 3, 2014) ……………………….. |
1a |
Appendix B (Court of Appeals’ Order denying Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, filed May 19, 2014) …………………………… |
2a |
Appendix C (District Court’s Memorandum Decision dated July 2, 2013) ……………………………………. |
3a |
Appendix D (District Court’s Order dated March 19, 2013) …………………………………… |
9a |
Appendix E (District Court’s Memorandum Decision dated February 11, 2013) ……………………………. |
11a |
Appendix F (Judge Briccetti’s May 14, 2012 Order) …………………………………………….. |
24a |
Appendix G (Amended Complaint, filed June 20, 2012) ……………………………………………… |
28a |
Appendix H (Judge Briccetti’s June 19, 2012 Order) …………………………………………….. |
64a |
Appendix I (Petitioner’s letter dated July 20, 2012) ……………………………………………… |
65a |
Appendix J (Petitioner’s letter dated December 23, 2012) ………………………………………. |
67a |
Appendix K (Petitioner’s letter dated January 27, 2013) ………………………………………….. |
69a |
Appendix L (Judge Briccetti’s Order dated February 22, 2013) …………………………………. |
70a |
Appendix M (Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, filed February 26, 2013) …………………….. |
72a |
v |
|
Appendix N (Motion to Appoint Next Friend, filed March 8, 2013) ……………………………………. |
80a |
Appendix O (Affidavit in support of Motion to Appoint Next Friend, filed March 8, 2013) …………………………………………….. |
85a |
Appendix P (Amended Motion for Reconsideration, filed March 11, 2013) ……………………….. |
137a |
Appendix Q (Judge Briccetti’s Order dated April 2, 2013) ……………………………………… |
145a |
Appendix R (Petitioner’s Motion for Leave to Amend and Supplement the Amended Complaint, filed April 29, 2013) ………………………………. |
149a |
Appendix S (Petitioner’s Motion for Protective Order and Appointment of Next Friend, filed April 29, 2013) ……………………………….. |
153a |
Appendix T (Petitioner’ Motion to Revert Position and Preserve Justice, filed April 29, 2013) …………………………………………….. |
167a |
Appendix U (Modified Second Amended Complaint, filed May 2, 2013) ………………………………….. |
171a |
Appendix V (Petitioner’s Second Motion for Leave to File Modified Second Amended and Supplemental Complaint, filed May 17, 2013) ………………………………… |
229a |
Appendix W (Judge Briccetti’s Memorandum Decision dated May 28, 2013) …………………………………. |
235a |
Appendix X (Judge Briccetti’s Order to show cause for partial default judgment, filed January 25, 2013) ……………………………… |
240a |
Appendix Y (Petitioner’s Motion for Extrinsic Fraud Inquest, filed June 4, 2013) ……………………. |
242a |
Appendix Z (Complaint filed in Independent Action brought by Petitioner pursuant to Rule 60(d) of FRCP, filed July 30, 2013) …………………………………………….. |
247a |
Appendix AA (Chief Judge Preska’s Order dated September 20, 2013) ……………………………. |
304a |
Appendix AB (Chief Judge Preska’s Order, entered October 2, 2013) …………………………….. |
305a |
vi |
|
Appendix AC (Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, filed October 30, 2013) …………………….. |
310a |
Appendix AD (Petitioner’s Motion for Recusal and/or Disqualification, filed October 30, 2013) …………………………………………… |
324a |
Appendix AE (Petitioner’s Affidavit in support of Motion for Recusal and/or Disqualification, filed October 30, 2013) ……………………… |
331a |
Appendix AF (Exhibit ‘A’ attached to Petitioner’s Affidavit in support of Motion for Recusal, filed October 30, 2013) …………………………… |
341a |
Appendix AG (Exhibit ‘B’ attached to Petitioner’s Affidavit in support of Motion for Recusal, filed October 30, 2013) …………………………… |
353a |
Appendix AH (Judge Preska’s Order, entered December 18, 2013) …………………………… |
355a |
Appendix AI (Petitioner’s Notice of Appeal, filed January 9, 2014) …………………………………… |
361a |
Appendix AJ (Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, filed April 15, 2014) ………………………….. |
362a |
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Acito v. IMCERA Grp., Inc. 47 F.3d 47, 55 (2d Cir. 1995) ………………………………… |
26 |
Arena v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 216 F. Supp. 2d 146, 155 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) ……………………. |
30 |
Bruce v. Miller, 360 P.2d 508 (1960) ………………………… | 17 |
Bullock v. United States, 721 F.2d 713, 718 (10th Circ.1983) …………………………….. |
18 |
Capogrosso v. Supreme Court of N.J., 588 F.3d 180, 184 (3rd Cir. 2009) ………………………………. |
28, 29 |
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991) ………….. | 18 |
Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, at 27-28 (1980) ……………… | 29 |
Envirotech Corp. v. Amstar Corp., 48 F.3d 1237 (Fed. Circ. 1995) …………………………………. |
17, 18 |
vii |
|
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) ……………….. | 30, 31 |
Exxon Mobil v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) ………………………………………. |
24 |
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) ……………………. | 26 |
Green v. Mattingly, 585 F.3d 97, 102 (2d Cir. 2009) ………………………………… |
24 |
Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep’t, 421 F.3d 185, 195 (3rd Cir. 2005) ……………………………… |
29 |
Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944) ……………………………………………… |
18, 19 |
Hoblock v. Albany County Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 2005) …………………………………… |
23, 24 |
In re Winstar Commc’ns, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7618, at 4 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ……………………………. |
26 |
Lewittes v. Lobis, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16320, 41 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) …………………………….. |
29 |
McKnight V. Middleton 699 F. Supp.2d 507, 514 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) ………………………. |
23, 24 |
Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 695 (1973) ……………………………………… |
30 |
People v. McGee, 49 N.Y.2d 48, 57-58 (N.Y. 1979) …………… | 22 |
Rook v. Rook, 353 S.E. 2d 756 (1987) ……………………….. | 17 |
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 261 U.S. 114, 117 (1923) ……………………………………….. |
21 |
Ruotolo v. City of N.Y., 514 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2008) ………………………………. |
26 |
United States v. Smiley, 553 F.3d 1137 ……………………….. | 18 |
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
42 U.S.C. § 1983 ……………………………….. | 2, 3, 12, 26, 28-30 |
42 U.S.C. § 1985 ……………………………….. | 2, 3, 12, 26, 28, 30 |
28 U.S.C. § 1331 ………………………………. | 2 |
28 U.S.C. § 1343 ………………………………. | 30 |
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) …………………………….. | 2 |
viii |
|
18 U.S.C. § 455(a) and (b)(2) …………………. | 13 |
18 U.S.C. § 144 ………………………………… | 13 |
FRCP Rule 17(c)(2) ……………………………. | 5 |
FRCP Rules 15(b)(2) and 15(d) ……………….. | 9 |
FRCP Rule 60(d) ……………………………….. | 12, 15, 18 |
FRCP Rule 60 ……………………………………. | 13, 15, 32 |
FRCP Rules 50, 52, and 59 ……………………. | 13, 15 |
FRCP 59(e)……………………………………… | 13 |
Local Civil Rule 6.3 …………………………….. | 13, 15 |
Local Rule 27.1 ………………………………… | 14 |
Canon Codes of Judicial Conduct ……………. | 9 |
Canon Codes of Judicial Conduct 2(A),(B), 3(A)(1),(3),(4), and 3(C)(1)(a) …………………. |
13 |
Rule 27(b) of Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure ………………………… |
14 |
Rule 4(a)(4)(A) of Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure ……………………………. |
15, 32 |
United States Constitution’s 14th Amendment |
2 |
Doctrine of res judicata …………………………. | 13, 16-17 |
Rooker-Feldman Doctrine …………………….. | 6-8, 10, 19-21, 24, 25, 31 |
ix
No. 14-5784
in the
Supreme Court Of The United States
JACOB TEITELBAUM, individually and
as father to CHILD A and CHILD B,
Petitioner
v.
JUDA KATZ, ET AL.,
Respondents
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the
judgments below.
OPINIONS BELOW
The Order of the Court of Appeals dismissing Petitioner’s Appeal, entered on April 2, 2014, appears at Appendix A to this petition. The Court of Appeals’ Order denying Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, entered on May 19, 2014 appears at Appending B to this petition.
The Decisions issued by the District Court (S.D.N.Y.), and entered on July 2, 2013; March 19, 2013; and February 11, 2013; respectively, from which Notice of Appeal was filed by Petitioner, appear at Appendices C, D, and E, respectively.
1
JURISDICTION
The federal action arises under the United States Constitution’s 14th Amendment and under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, as a federal civil rights action, raising federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on April 3, 2014, and the motion for its reconsideration was entered on May 19, 2014. The United States Supreme Court is only one that has the power to make the lower court recognize the Constitutional Rights of an individual. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This evil practice is succinctly described in the criminal complaint (Appendix AF) that was filed in an analogous matter, and is already a widespread menace, as reported in Huffington Post dated October 10, 2013 (Appendix AG). Certain people in the community disagreed with the religious campaign.
They entered into a conspiracy with Orange County, a State actor, as well as others outside the community, with an objective to unlawfully stop Petitioner from participating in the religious campaign.In pursuance of aforesaid conspiracy, Petitioner has constantly been subjected to severe terrorization and intimidation by certain individuals and
2
establishments – some of whom are named herein as Respondents – acting in collusion with and/or with the tacit support of Respondent Orange County.
To further the object of conspiracy, the Respondents, acting in concert and collaboration with each other and separately, as well as with the connivance of Respondent Orange County, not only subjected Plaintiff to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment but also used the State machinery directly and/or indirectly, and abused the process of law, to illegally deprive Petitioner of his Fundamental Rights granted to him by the U.S. Constitution.
The “Original Complaint”, inter alia, alleged that in pursuance of aforesaid conspiracy, Petitioner was subjected to severe intimidation, harassment, and terror; his freedom was unlawfully taken away; his family was broken up; and his children were taken away from him by some of the Respondents, acting in collusion with and/or with the tacit support of Respondent Orange County, thereby forcing him to live under constant fear, trauma and emotional turmoil, caused by the continued and ongoing terror they unleashed upon him, with a common objective to unlawfully
3
deprive him of his Fundamental Constitutional Rights, in an attempt to stop him from participating in aforesaid religious campaign.
Chief District Judge, Loretta A. Preska, by her May 2, 2012 Order, granted Petitioner’s application to proceed in forma pauperis. The case was then assigned to Judge Vincent Briccetti by Notice of Assignment dated May 10, 2012.
Judge Briccetti, by his May 14, 2012 Order (Appendix F), dismissed Petitioner’s claims against two of the Respondents that were named as defendants in Original Complaint; viz., (a) Andrew P. Bivona, a judge of the Family Court of Orange County, on the ground of judicial immunity, and (b) Orange County Family Court, on the ground of sovereign immunity provided by the Eleventh Amendment.
Accordingly, on June 20, 2012, Petitioner filed an “Amended Complaint” (Appendix G), deleting the originally named defendants, Judge Andrew P. Bivona, and the Orange County Family Court. Barring this deletion, Original Complaint and Amended Complaint were identical in all other aspects.
Meanwhile, Judge Briccetti, in his June 19, 2012 Order (Appendix H), acknowledging receipt of “letter from plaintiff stating that he has been ‘threatened, intimidated and harassed in an attempt to force [him] to withdraw [his] complaint.’ [and] he fears for his safety,” directed Petitioner and County Attorney for the County of Orange to appear for a conference regarding these allegations on July 2, 2012. At the conference, as pointed out in Petitioner’s letter dated July 20, 2012 addressed to Judge Briccetti (Appendix I), Petitioner “detailed some of the
4
intimidation [he was] withstanding [that was] targeted to coerce [him] to stop the Original Action,” but no suitable action was ordered by Judge Briccetti.
In same letter dated July 20, 2012 (Appendix I), Petitioner specifically requested Judge Briccetti to allow Petitioner’s friend, “Mr. Ben Friedman, [to] take over th[e] [Original] Action as his ‘Next Friend’ under FRCP Rule 17(c)(2) (…) whereby the intimidation would not bear any effect on th[e] [Original] Action; [rather], it would take [Petitioner’s] involvement of this case out, avoiding further harassment and intimidation and risk of closure [of the Original Action]”. However, Petitioner’s request was denied outright by an endorsement made by Judge Briccetti on said letter (Appendix I) itself.
Likewise, Judge Briccetti denied many other valid requests of Petitioner. In letter dated December 23, 2012 (Appendix J), Petitioner requested for dismissal of Respondent David Rubenstein’s Motion to Dismiss on the ground of delay, as the said Motion was filed on December 18, 2012 despite Rubenstein having been served with Amended Complaint on June 26, 2012. But Judge Briccetti brusquely denied Petitioner’s request by a terse order endorsed on said letter (Appendix J) itself.
Similarly, Petitioner’s request made by letter dated January 27, 2013 (Appendix K) that “in light of the recent increased terror by the Defendants to stop [him] from continuing t[he] [Original] Action, [he may be] allow[ed] to send urgent correspondence to [Judge Briccetti’s] Chambers by fax in order to avoid long delays by mail or difficult and expensive transportation,” was denied unjustifiedly.
5
At the same time, Judge Briccetti, without any justification, entertained several Motions to Dismiss the Amended Complaint, filed by most, but not all, of the Respondents, named as defendants in Original Action, months after their having been served with the Amended Complaint, and even granted the belated requests of some of them to join in the Motions to Dismiss previously filed by others.
By Memorandum Decision dated February 11, 2013 (Appendix E), Judge Briccetti granted five Motions to Dismiss filed by Respondents – (1) Children’s Rights Society of Orange County (“CRS”) and Kim Pavlovic; (2) Maria Petrizio; (3) Stephanie Bazile, Christine Brunet, Child Protective Services of Orange County (“CPS”), and Department of Social Services of Orange County (“DSS”); (4) Kiryas Joel Community Ambulance Corporation (“Kiryas Joel EMS”); and (5) David Rubenstein for the following reasons:
The February 11, 2013 Decision (Appendix E); however, granted Petitioner leave to further amend his Amended Complaint with respect to his claims against Kiryas Joel EMS and Rubenstein, and directed him to file amended pleadings by March 11, 2013. Incidentally, in February 11, 2013
6
Decision (Appendix E), Judge Briccetti erroneously stated: “[a]ccording to the docket, [defendants] Chaya and Judah Katz have not been served with the amended complaint, and they are not parties to any of the pending motions to dismiss,” whereas Katzes had been served with Amended Complaint on September 14, 2012.
Later, acknowledging that Katzes had been served, Judge Briccetti issued Order dated February 22, 2013 (Appendix L) granting Petitioner leave to further amend the Amended Complaint with respect to his claims against the Katzes and Tennenbaums as well. Petitioner’s time to file Second Amended Complaint was extended to April 12, 2013.
On February 26, 2013, Petitioner filed a “Motion to Reconsider” (Appendix M) the February 11, 2013 Decision (Appendix E), citing substantive grounds and case-law to show that Petitioner’s claims were not hit by Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, and to seek leave of the Court to – (a) allow him time to further amend his Amended Complaint as to the Respondents against whom his claims were dismissed by the February 11, 2013 Decision (Appendix E) under the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine; and (b) name Orange County and certain municipal entities as defendants.
On March 8, 2013, Petitioner’s friend, Mr. Ben Friedman, a non-party, filed “Motion to Appoint [him Petitioner’s] Next Friend” (Appendix N) along with a supporting Affidavit (Appendix O). Mr. Friedman, along with his Affidavit (Appendix O, at p.127-135), also filed Petitioner’s letter dated February 20, 2013, addressed to Chief Judge Preska, wherein Petitioner had not only stated the
7
instances of his continuing deprivation of constitutional rights by the conspiratorial behaviour of Respondents both before and after the filing of Original Action but also cited the specific factual circumstances and developments which showed that fraud was being enacted upon the Court.
While aforesaid Motion to Appoint Next Friend (Appendix N) was still pending, Mr. Ben Friedman – as Petitioner’s Next Friend – filed on March 11, 2013 an “Amended Motion to Reconsider” (Appendix P) the February 11, 2013 Decision (Appendix E), specifically citing detailed reasons and extensive case-law why Rooker-Feldman Doctrine did not apply to this action.
Judge Briccetti denied the Amended Motion for Reconsideration by an arbitrary, frivolous and biased Order dated March 19, 2013 (Appendix D), in which he did not even bother to discuss any of the grounds and case-law cited by Petitioner in said Motion, nor gave any reasons for rejecting them.
By Order dated April 2, 2013 (Appendix Q), Judge Briccetti denied Mr. Ben Friedman’s Motion to Appoint Next Friend, altogether ignoring the averments made in his supporting Affidavit as well as Petitioner’s letter (Appendix O, at p.127-135) filed therewith, and extended Petitioner’s time to file a second amended complaint against Respondents; namely, Kiryas Joel EMS, Rubenstein, Juda Katz, Chaya Katz, Joel Tennenbaum, and Bluma Tennenbaum to May 2, 2013. This, coupled with utter disdain with which he had denied Petitioner’s earlier requests, indicated that Judge Briccetti’s decisions were swayed by the influence of vested interests.
On April 29, 2013, Petitioner filed the following three Motions:
8
While aforementioned three Motions were still pending, Petitioner filed “Modified Second Amended Complaint” (Appendix U) on May 2, 2013, and “Second Motion for Leave to File Modified Second Amended and Supplemental Complaint” (Appendix V) on May 17, 2013.
Respondents Kiryas Joel EMS and Rubenstein filed their “Motions to Dismiss” on May 20 and 22, 2013, respectively.
By Memorandum Decision dated May 28, 2013 (Appendix W), Judge Briccetti denied Petitioner’s “Motion for Protective Order and Appointment of Next Friend”
9
(Appendix S), as well as “Motion to Revert Position and Preserve Justice” (Appendix T), without addressing and/or discussing any of the reasons and arguments – duly supported by case-law – cited therein by Petitioner.
Oddly, in the same May 28, 2013 Decision (Appendix W), Judge Briccetti, without giving Petitioner any opportunity of being heard, granted Respondent John Francis X. Burke’s “Motion to Dismiss” under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Even before granting Respondent Burke’s Motion to Dismiss, Judge Briccetti had already demonstrated his bias by allowing Respondent Burke to belatedly file “Notice of Motion to Dismiss” on February 25, 2013 in an apparent abuse of process of law, as Judge Briccetti had himself previously issued an Order to Show Cause for Partial Default Judgment, entered January 25, 2013 (Appendix X), directing Respondent Burke to appear in person on February 20, 2013, and to show cause why default judgment should not be issued against him as he had been served with the Amended Complaint on as early as September 24, 2012.
Aggrieved by the extrinsic fraud that was being perpetrated upon the Court, as well as Judge Briccetti’s extreme bias, that was manifested in Judge Briccetti’s last few Decisions and Orders, Petitioner filed on June 4, 2013, a “Motion for Extrinsic Fraud Inquest” (Appendix Y), specifically alleging that “[Respondents] had perpetrated extrinsic fraud (…) upon th[e] Court to defraud and harm [him], and th[e] Court didn’t stop it but participated in the fraud,” and requesting the Court “to schedule an inquest over the extrinsic fraud in th[e] action.”
10
Judge Briccetti issued Memorandum Decision dated July 2, 2013 (Appendix C), whereby “[Respondents’] motions to dismiss [Petitioner’s modified] second amended complaint [we]re GRANTED, and [Petitioner’s] various motions to further amend the complaint and for other relief [we]re DENIED.”
Even a cursory glance at the July 2, 2013 Decision (Appendix C) reveals that Judge Briccetti did not address or discuss therein any of the grounds and reasons cited in Petitioner’s various Motions that were summarily declined in said Decision. Not only this, even though Respondents Juda Katz, Chaya Katz, Joel Tennenbaum, and Bluma Tennenbaum – against whom Judge Briccetti, by his Orders dated February 22, 2013 and April 2, 2013 (Appendices L and Q, respectively), had granted Petitioner leave to amend his Amended Complaint – did not file any Motion to Dismiss[3]; still, Judge Briccetti, in a blatant display of undue haste, caused by extraneous influence of vested interests, dismissed Petitioner’s claims against these Respondents, too, by his July 2, 2013 Decision (Appendix C), thereby confirming that his said Decision, as well as his prior Orders and Decisions, were vitiated by fraud, in which he, too, had participated under the pressure of vested interests.
Thus, as a result of the acute bias of Judge Briccetti, as well as the fraud enacted upon the Trial Court, in which fraud Judge Briccetti, too, was involved, Petitioner never got the rightful opportunity of being heard in the Trial Court.
[3] A careful perusal of the “Doc. ## 171, 172, 190, 198, 208, 211, 223, 227” of Case No. 12-CV-2858, which are referred to in July 2, 2013 Decision (Appendix C) as “all of the pending motions”, reveals that none of these motions was filed by any of the Respondents; namely, Juda Katz, Chaya Katz, Joel Tennenbaum, and Bluma Tennenbaum, meaning thereby that they did not file any Motion to Dismiss the Modified Second Amended Complaint, still it was dismissed against them by Judge Briccetti without giving any reason in his said Decision..
11
The July 2013 Complaint (Appendix Z) not only named some new defendants; inter alia, including Orange County, a State actor, and Judge Briccetti, in addition to the Respondents named herein, but also pleaded new causes of action, including “extrinsic fraud”, and set forth – (a) Petitioner’s claims under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 for various deprivations of his Fundamental Constitutional Rights by Respondents and new defendants named therein, (b) a clear pattern of how he was being targeted, intimidated, and terrorized in pursuance of a deliberate conspiracy among them, and (c) a clear meeting of their minds.
By Order dated September 20, 2013 (Appendix AA), Chief District Judge Loretta A. Preska granted IFP status to Petitioner.
12
Thereafter, Chief Judge Preska abruptly issued an Order of Dismissal, entered on October 2, 2013 (Appendix AB), dismissing the Independent Action against Respondent Judge Briccetti under the doctrine of judicial immunity, and against the other Respondents (as well as remaining defendants named in the Independent Action) under the doctrine of res judicata.
On October 8, 2013, Petitioner sent a letter to Chief Judge Preska, requesting additional time to file a motion for reconsideration under FRCP 59(e) and Local Civil Rule 6.3. Considering the letter as a motion for extension of time, Chief Judge Preska denied Petitioner’s request by her Order dated October 18, 2013.
On October 30, 2013; i.e., within 28 days of entry of Chief Judge Preska’s Order of Dismissal, entered on October 2, 2013 (Appendix AB), Petitioner filed:
Both aforesaid Motions were denied by Chief Judge Preska by Order dated December 17, 2013, which was entered on December 18, 2013). (Appendix AH).
13
from the entry of Chief Judge Preska’s last Order, entered on December 18, 2013) (Appendix AH), Petitioner filed Notice of Appeal (Appendix AI) from District Court’s Memorandum Decision dated and entered July 2, 2013 (Appendix C); Order dated March 19, 2013 (entered on March 20, 2013) (Appendix D), and Memorandum Decision dated February 11, 2013 (entered February 13, 2013) (Appendix C).
On February 3, 2014, Petitioner also filed Motion for Leave to appeal in forma pauperis along with necessary Declaration and Affidavit.
By Order dated April 3, 2014 (Appendix A), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals “dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction” after “determin[ing] sua sponte that notice of appeal was untimely filed,” and “denied as moot” the Petitioner’s Motion “for in forma pauperis status.
”On April 15, 2014, Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (Appendix AJ) pursuant to Local Rule 27.1 and Rule 27(b) of FRAP, requesting the Court of Appeals to reconsider its April 3, 2014 Order (Appendix A); to admit his Notice of Appeal; and to grant him in forma pauperis status.
The Court of Appeals, by its Order dated May 19, 2014 (Appendix B), denied Petitioner’s aforesaid Motion for Reconsideration (Appendix AJ), leaving him no other option but to approach this Honorable Court with this Writ Petition.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
14
15
that were vitiated by fraud upon the court – in which fraud the presiding judge was himself involved – under the doctrines of res judicata and judicial immunity, because:
16
17
judicial function – thus where the impartial functions of the court have been directly corrupted.” Envirotech Corp. v. Amstar Corp., 48 F.3d 1237 (Fed. Circ. 1995) (quoting Bullock v. United States, 721 F.2d 713, 718 (10th Circ.1983)). Intentional corruption or improper influence aren’t even necessary elements of fraud on the court if one establishes that the judge has not performed his common judicial function. Such a malfunction of the judicial machinery is itself enough to establish fraud on the court. Id.
18
which fraud cannot complacently be toleratedconsistently with the good order of society. Surely it cannot be that preservation of the integrity of the judicial process must always wait upon the diligence of litigants. The public welfare demands that the agencies of public justice be not so impotent that they must always be mute and helpless victims of deception and fraud.”
[4] Claims against DSS, CPS, Christine Brunet, Stephanie Bazile, CRS, Kim Pavlovic, and Maria Petrizio were dismissed by February 11, 2013 Decision (Appendix E), and claims against Francis X. Burke by May 28, 2013 Decision (Appendix W), all under Rooker-Feldman Doctrine.
19
“Four requirements must be met for the [Rooker-Feldman] doctrine to apply: (1) the federal court plaintiff must have lost in state court, (2) the plaintiff must complain of injuries caused by a state court judgment, (3) the plaintiff must invite district court review and rejection of that judgment, and (4) the state court judgment must have been rendered before the district court proceedings commenced. The first and fourth requirements are procedural, and the second and third requirements are substantive;”
but improperly concluded that:
“All four requirements are met here: (1) plaintiff lost in family court by admitting to neglecting his children and consequently losing custody of them; (2) plaintiff’s injuries (i.e. violation of his alleged constitutional right to have custody of his children and to raise them as he sees fit) were caused by the family court’s judgment; (3) plaintiff now asks this Court to reconsider the merits of the family court’s determinations; and (4) the family court decision was rendered before this action was commenced.”
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issue of the violation of Petitioner’s constitutional rights and conspiracy claims. These issues were not decided by family court prior to the Original Action being brought, and this is fundamental to the applicability of Rooker-Feldman doctrine. “[I]n determining whether that question was raised and decided we must be guided by the record. It has been examined and we find it does not show that the question was raised in any way prior to the judgment of affirmance in the Supreme Court.” Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 261 U.S. 114, 117 (1923).
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mean that he complained of injuries caused by the adjudications that occurred in family court. The Respondents’ conspiratorial behavior, irrespective of the result in the family court, is actionable because the conspiracy that was committed against Petitioner, as a matter of law, is a separate issue from any other act by Respondents. “The crime of conspiracy is an offense separate from the crime that is the object of the conspiracy. Once an illicit agreement is shown, the overt act of any conspirator may be attributed to other conspirators to establish the offense of conspiracy (cf. People v Salko, 47 NY2d 230; People v Sher, 68 Misc 2d 917) and that act may be the object crime.” People v. McGee, 49 N.Y.2d 48, 57-58 (N.Y. 1979). Ergo, the conspiracy asserted by Petitioner stands on its own and is in no way dependent on the judicial results in family court.
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review of the record from the family court would show that the issues addressed in the family court were fundamentally different from those presented before the District Court, and did not depend on the District Court overruling or in any way superseding the authority of the family court.
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(2d Cir. 2005) (alterations in original) (quoting Exxon Mobil v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). “The first and fourth requirements are procedural, while the second and third are substantive.” Id. In this case, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar Petitioner’s claims because Petitioner did not “invite district court review and rejection” of a state court judgment. Id. The doctrine only applies when “the requested federal court remedy of an alleged injury caused by a state court judgment would require overturning or modifying that state court judgment.”Id.
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particularly as it regards the ongoing conspiratorial harassment and violations of his constitutional rights.
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been named as defendants in Original Complaint, were deleted from the “Amended Complaint” by Petitioner in view of Judge Briccetti’s May 14, 2012 Order (Appendix F). As such, it was not an “Amended Complaint” in the true sense.
[5] See February 11, 2013 Decision (Appendix E).
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“P[etitioner] is a resident in a Hasidic, ultra-Orthodox, closely-knit community. … P[etitioner] got involved in a religious campaign against forced divorces that have been taking place through the use of kidnapping within the community.” (Appendix U, at ¶1) “Certain people in the community disagreed with the religious campaign, this resulted in severe terror and intimidation when individuals in the community conspired with State actor Defendant Orange County and others outside this community against P[etitioner] in a conspired collaboration acting in concert and separately in a conspiratorial manner to further this goal to intimidate, deprive and violate P[etitioner]’s Civil Rights in many different ways.” (Appendix U, at ¶2) “P[etitioner] was subjected to severe intimidation, harassment, terror, his freedom was jeopardized, his family broken up, his children taken away and terminated from him, pushing P[etitioner] into a homeless situation and without normal living
[6] “SAC” was theshort name given to “Modified Second Amended Complaint” in July 2, 2013 Decision (Appendix C).
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conditions, under constant fear, trauma and emotional turmoil by the continued and ongoing terror.” (Appendix U, at ¶4) “This has left the P[etitioner] with no other option than to seek remedy in this Court. This complaint sets forth a clear pattern of P[etitioner] being targeted, intimidated, and terrorized, it sets forth a clear meeting of the minds between the conspirators, and all Defendants including Defendant Orange County, a State actor. Plaintiff sets forth his claims through 1983 and 1985 actions, for claims of various deprivations of Fundamental Constitutional Rights.” (Appendix U, at ¶6)
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circumstances. The Court is equally mindful that caution is advised in any pre-trial disposition of conspiracy allegations in civil rights actions.” Id. at 184-185.
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any … person within the jurisdiction [of the United States] to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law [or a] suit [in] equity ….” Arena v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 216 F. Supp. 2d 146, 155 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only” ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the … claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” “Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. __, (2007) (slip op., at 7-8) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). In addition, when ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint. Bell Atlantic Corp., supra, at __ (slip op., at 8-9) (citing Swierkiewicz v.
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Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 508, n. 1 (2002); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).”
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leave to amend his pleadings; and the Court of Appeals has dismissed his Appeal after incorrectly determining that notice of appeal was untimely filed, apparently without considering that the time limit for filing of Appeal had been extended under Rule 4(a)(4)(A) of F.R.A.P. by timely filing of motions pursuant to, inter alia, Rule 60 F.R.C.P. by Petitioner in the District Court.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.
Dated: August 12, 2014 Respectfully Submitted,
Jacob Teitelbaum
Petitioner Pro Se
c/o Ben Friedman
5 Leipnik Way, #102
Monroe, N.Y. 10950
845-782-7830
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